Development, Democracy and Political Regime Durability in EU 27 by Mutascu, Mihai
Journal of Cambridge Studies 
17 
 
Development, Democracy and Political Regime Durability in EU 27 
Mihai MUTASCU 
 
LEO (Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orléans) UMR6221, Faculté de Droit d'Economie et de 
Gestion, University of Orléans, Rue de Blois - B.P. 6739, 45067, Orléans, France 
Email: mihai.mutascu@gmail.com 
 
Abstract: 
The paper analyzes empirically, in E.U. 27’s case, the relationship between economic 
development, intensity of democratization and political regime durability, using a binary choice 
panel model. The main conclusion of the paper shows that: 
(1) In European strong democratic republic, the best economic development can be obtained 
only if the political regime durability is very high. 
(2) In European strong autocratic monarchy, the best economic development can be obtained 
even if the political regime durability is very low. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When viewed over a long period of time, strong connections exist between economic 
development, democracy and political regime durability. In this context, our approach tries to 
find the intensity of this relationship, especially in regards to E.U.27 (European Union 27), 
using a binary choice panel model.  
Traditionally, Nafziger (2006) considers economic development to be economic growth 
accompanied by changes in output distribution and economic structure. In a modern vision, 
Todaro and Smith (2009) see economic development in terms of the reduction or elimination of 
poverty, inequality and unemployment within the context of a growing economy. Adelman and 
Yeldan (2000) illustrates that the concept of development must include: (1) self-sustaining 
growth; (2) structural changes in patterns of production; (3) technological upgrading; (4) social, 
political and institutional modernization; and (5) augmentation of social human conditions. 
The level of economic development varies from one period to another and from one country to 
another, being subordinate to a series of factors such as human capital, physical capital, 
population and technological progress. Bildirici and Sunal (2006) show that with these 
mentioned factors, several other determinants appear, such as: public debt, role of the state, tax 
structure, political regime and instability, defense expenditures, geographical position, foreign 
capital, specialization in foreign trade and technological adaptation.  
In the case of political factors, two of them are particularly noteworthy: the intensity of 
democratization and the political regime durability. In a classical approach, Welzel (2007) 
defines democracy by constitutional constraints on state power and by popular controls over 
state power. From another perspective, for Vanhanen (2003), democracy means free popular 
elections to fill positions of power. The same author notes that the political regime durability is 
the number of years since the most recent regime changed or the end of a transition period 
defined by the lack of stable political institutions. 
Except Section 1, the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 treats the review of literature, 
followed by data description and its sources. Section 3 presents methodology and results of the 
analyses. Section 4 concludes. 
II. LITERATURE 
The field literature offers contradictory results about the sign of considered variables, which 
reflect the connection between economic development, democracy and political stability.  
Sirowy and Inkeles (1990) believe that democracy facilitates economic development and not 
vice versa. More precisely, they said “democracy first and development later”. In the same way, 
Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (2000) consider that, generally, political instability 
decreases state’s economic development (in particular, in autocracies).  
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Siegle, Weinstein and Halperin (2004) argue that democracy brings political checks and 
balances, responsiveness to citizen priorities, openness, and self-correcting mechanisms - all of 
them contributing to steady growth and superior living conditions. Oliveira-Brochado and 
Martins (2005) reveal a positive but not perfect relationship between democracy and economic 
and human development, thus presenting new insights for the understanding of the 
heterogeneity of behaviors relatively to political indicators. 
Also, Campos (1994) and Menocal (2007) claim that democracy determines economic 
development (measured with per capita income level) and Bhagwati (2002) thinks that 
democracy is better for development only when it is accompanied by an expansion of markets 
and competition.  
Bardhan (1999) is reticent regarding the investigation methodology and the quality of the 
existing data sets. He recommends the traditional analysis, using measures such as per capita 
income or the human development index, but combats the “cross-country regressions.” 
All the theoretical elements presented allow us to formulate two theoretical working 
assumptions. The hypotheses are: 
H1: The level of economic development is growing as the intensity of democratization is 
increasing. 
H2: The level of economic development is growing as the political regime durability is 
increasing. 
The meanings of the hypothesis’ work relations are presented in Table 1, in Appendix. 
III. DATA, METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
Starting with the theoretical argues shown, the paper analyzes empirically, in E.U.27’s case, the 
relationship between economic development, intensity of democratization and political regime 
durability.  
a. The economic development (GDP per capita - GDPP) is taken from International Monetary 
Fund (2009) and suggests the level of economic development as GDP per capita (current 
international dollar). This measure is used as a component of the human development index 
(HDI) because the data set of HDI is too short and fractionated for our binary choice panel 
objective analysis. 
b. Intensity of democratization (Index of Democratization - ID) is taken from Marshall et al. 
(2009) and represents the rank of democracy’s level: from +10 “strongly democratic” to -10 
“strongly autocratic”. 
c. Political regime durability (Regime Durability Score - RD) is taken from Marshall et al. 
(2009) and represents the number of years since the most recent regime change or the end of 
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transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions: from 0 “very unstable” to 
+∞ “very stable”. 
The data set is covering the period 1990-2009, in E.U.27’s case, in panel form, with 25 cross-
sections (ID and RD, for Luxembourg and Malta, is unavailable) and 475 observations (see the 
variables and its sources in Table 2, in Appendix). 
Generally, the field literature shows that the analysis’ instruments regarding considered 
relationship refer to the descriptive methods, simple and multiple OLS regressions, pooled OLS 
models, dynamic probit models or, in a modern new trend, panel models, panel VAR models or 
fuzzy alternative. So, we have selected for our analysis a binary choice panel model type. For 
the first time, this type of model has been used in economy in the 1950s. The pioneer of binary 
choice model in economic field treats the analysis of ownership of cars as a function of 
household income (Farrell, in 1954). 
Why we have chosen binary choice model type and not OLS one? For two reasons: (a) 
Pohlmann and Leitner (2003) show that logistic regression results will be comparable to those 
of OLS in many respects, but give more accurate predictions of probabilities on the dependent 
outcome; and (b) Vogelvang (2005) notes that, generally, all the logit estimates are clearly 
larger than the OLS estimate.  
Based on variables and theoretical assumptions made above, in our binary choice panel 
approach, the dependent variable GDPP becomes “The probability of GDP per capita to 
increase with 5%” - P: 
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where n is a period. 
Finally, we entered a control dummy variable - T, which reflects the type of the state (republic 
or monarchy). The reason is given by Bjørnskov and Kurrild-Klitgaard (2008): the republics 
ought to grow faster than monarchies and experience lower transitional costs following reforms. 
We note that the T does not add the problem of collinearity among regressors because T is not a 
dimension of democracy or autocracy. If the state is a republic, the dummy is 1, and if the state 
is a monarchy, dummy is 0.  
The signs of P (dependent variable) and its determinant factors (ID, RD and T) are shown in 
Table 3, in Appendix. Among four proposed binary choice panel models, with probit, logit and 
extreme value alternatives, based on McFadden R-squared and Akaike info, we have selected a 
logit model (2) (Table 4, in Appendix). All the models have very low levels of McFadden R-
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squared. As Brooks (2008) notes, there is not a problem, because this is often the case for 
limited dependent variable models, such is binary choice types. 
According to Dougherty (2007), “in logit estimation one hypothesizes that the probability P of 
the occurrence of the event is determined by the function”: 
i
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where Z is a linear function of the explanatory variables. 
The marginal effect of Z on the probability, which will be denoted f(Z), is given by the 
derivative of this function with respect to Z: 
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As with logit analysis, the marginal effect of any variable is not constant. It depends on the 
value of f(Z), which in turn depends on the values of each of the explanatory variables. To 
obtain a summary statistic for the marginal effect, the usual procedure is parallel to that used in 
logit analysis, based on the mean values of the explanatory variables. 
In the considered case, Z is given by: 
εxT
3
βxRD
2
βxID
1
βαZ                                   (4) 
where α - the intercept term, β1, 2, 3 - the slops and ε - the disturbance term. Table 5, in 
Appendix, shows that from 475 included P observations, 53.7% are 0 and 46.3% are 1. 
The econometric tests of the “Logit Panel Model”, presented in Table 6, in Appendix, show 
that the coefficients are significant at standard levels of confidence (at 10%), a conclusion 
reinforced by the low values of the probabilities. The value of the LR-test is 15.61 (0.001), so 
the null hypothesis of zero slopes can be rejected. 
To obtain the robust standard errors, we used Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman optimization 
algorithm. Based on the model, the prediction values are illustrated in Table 7, in Appendix. 
The estimated model correctly predicts 60.42% of the observations (68.63% of the Dep=0 and 
50.91% of the Dep=1 observations). Overall, the estimated equation is 6.74% points better at 
predicting responses than the constant probability model.  
The correlogram of standardized residuals and the correlogram of standardized residuals 
squared show that there are not autocorrelations or partial correlations of the residuals for all 
considerate lags, except the lag 1 (Table 8 and 9, in Appendix). More, the Andrews and 
Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Tests show that the caution in order to interpret the results 
is minimal (Table 10, in Appendix). 
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In conclusion, the model may be considered stabile and representative to describe, in E.U.27’s 
case, the connection between P and ID, RD & T. The method for identifying the effects of ID, 
RD & T on P consists in calculating the marginal effects with the mean values of the 
explanatory variables. The Table 11, in Appendix, shows the marginal effects, calculated by 
multiplying f(Z) with the estimate coefficients of the logit panel regression. Starting from the 
marginal effects measured on the “logit panel model”, we can identify the following results: 
- an one-point increase in the ID, increases by 5.84% the P; 
- an one-point increase in the RD, decreases by 0.19% the P; 
- an one-point increase in the T, increases by 11.78% the P. 
or 
- an one-point increase in the ID, decreases by 94.16% the P; 
- an one-point increase in the RD, increases by 99.81% the P; 
- an one-point increase in the T, decreases by 88.22% the P. 
We can observe that the results infirm considered hypothesis. More, the results combat partially 
the conclusions of all mentioned authors. A novelty of the paper is the existence of a significant 
impact of state’s type (republic or monarchy) on the economic development, in E.U.27. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the analyzed period, in U.E.27, a high level of democratization, with a low range of 
political regime durability, on republican base, determines a low level of the P. In this case, it’s 
plausible that the economic development’s level to be very low rather then very high (upper 5% 
annually). So, a European Union republican state, with high level of democratization, but 
unstable from political point of view, cannot ensure a circumstance for an appreciable level of 
economic development. The results show that republican democracy can be destructive for 
development, but this is not a rule. 
Otherwise, talking about a European Union monarchy, a high level of autocracy, with a high 
range of political regime durability, determines a high level of the P. In this statement, the 
economic development’s level it’s very high rather then very low (not upper 5% annually). The 
monarchical autocracy appears to be a good determinant for the economic development. 
Which is the reason? The main difference between republic and monarchy consists in the 
existence of presidential elections in republic’s case. In this type of state, the presidential 
election can determine some shocks on economic system and development, as in the period of 
the parliamentary election. So, some significantly implications of “republican elections’ 
attributes” on economic development can be identified.  
Based on this remarks, we can take two main conclusions: 
(1) In European strong democratic republic, the best economic development can be obtained 
only if the political regime durability is very high. 
Journal of Cambridge Studies 
23 
(2) In European strong autocratic monarchy, the best economic development can be obtained 
even if the political regime durability is very low. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1: The “signs” of the hypothesis’ work variables 
Variable and “tendency sign” Variable and “tendency sign” 
Economic development + or – The intensity of democratization + or – 
Economic development + or – The political regime durability + or – 
 
 
 
Table 2: The variables description and its sources 
Variable Measure and description Source 
Economic 
development 
(GDPP) 
GDP per capita, suggests the level of 
economic development as GDP per 
capita (current international dollar). 
International 
Monetary Fund, 
World Economic 
Outlook 
Database (2009) 
Intensity of 
Democratization 
(ID) 
Index of Democratization illustrates 
the rank of democracy’s level 
(democracy - high level, autocracy - 
low level) 
Marshall & 
Jaggers (2009) 
Political Regime 
Durability (RD) 
 
Regime Durability Score represents 
the number of years since the most 
recent regime change or the end of 
transition period defined by the lack 
of stable political institutions. 
Marshall & 
Jaggers (2009) 
Type of the state 
(T) 
Dummy variables, reflects the form 
of government (republic - 1 or 
monarchy - 0). 
Dummy 
methodology 
 
 
 
Table 3: The expected signs of P - ID, RD and T according to working hypothesis 
P The determinant factors of P The trend of determinant factors of P 
+ ID + 
+ RD + 
+ T + 
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Table 5: The P annual frequencies in 1990-2009 periods 
Dependent Variable: P   
     
     Value Count Percent Cumulative Count Percent 
     
     0 255 53 255 53.7 
1 220 46 475 100 
     
     
 
Table 6: The econometric tests of “Logit Panel Model P, ID, RD and T” 
Dependent Variable: P   
     
      Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ID 0.235246 0.102475 2.295635 0.0217 
RD -0.007982 0.004096 -1.948963 0.0513 
T 0.474224 0.273571 1.733460 0.0830 
C (Intercept) -2.487275 0.988317 -2.516678 0.0118 
     
     S.D. dependent var 0.499167     Mean dependent var 0.463158 
Akaike info criterion 1.364829     S.E. of regression 0.492552 
Schwarz criterion 1.399889     Sum squared resid 114.2683 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.378616     Log likelihood -320.1469 
LR statistic 15.61471     Restr. log likelihood -327.9543 
Prob(LR statistic) 0.001360     Avg. log likelihood -0.673993 
     
     Obs with Dep=0 255      Total obs 475 
Obs with Dep=1 220    
     
     
 
Table 7: The prediction values of P base on the model 
Dependent Variable: P     
       
            Estimated Equation            Constant Probability 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
       
       P(Dep=1)<=C 175 108 283 255 220 475 
P(Dep=1)>C 80 112 192 0 0 0 
Total 255 220 475 255 220 475 
Correct 175 112 287 255 0 255 
% Correct 68.63 50.91 60.42 100.00 0.00 53.68 
% Incorrect 31.37 49.09 39.58 0.00 100.00 46.32 
Total Gain* -31.37 50.91 6.74    
Percent Gain** NA 50.91 14.55    
       
       *Change in "% Correct" from default (constant probability) specification 
**Percent of incorrect (default) prediction corrected by equation 
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Table 8: The correlogram of standardized residuals 
       
       Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
       
              .|***   |        .|***   | 1 0.393 0.393 73.729 0.000 
       .|*     |        .|.     | 2 0.187 0.039 90.485 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 3 0.069 -0.020 92.781 0.000 
       .|*     |        .|.     | 4 0.078 0.061 95.744 0.000 
       .|*     |        .|.     | 5 0.084 0.041 99.111 0.000 
       .|*     |        .|*     | 6 0.126 0.083 106.79 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 7 0.059 -0.031 108.47 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 8 -0.021 -0.066 108.68 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 9 0.024 0.060 108.96 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 10 0.067 0.050 111.17 0.000 
       
       
  
 
Table 9: The correlogram of standardized residuals squared 
       
       Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
       
              .|**    |        .|**    | 1 0.222 0.222 23.650 0.000 
       .|.     |        *|.     | 2 -0.035 -0.089 24.229 0.000 
       *|.     |        *|.     | 3 -0.158 -0.138 36.206 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 4 -0.027 0.041 36.549 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 5 0.030 0.015 36.978 0.000 
       .|*     |        .|*     | 6 0.199 0.179 56.049 0.000 
       .|.     |        *|.     | 7 -0.019 -0.112 56.229 0.000 
       *|.     |        *|.     | 8 -0.143 -0.108 66.191 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 9 -0.054 0.062 67.583 0.000 
       .|*     |        .|*     | 10 0.095 0.080 72.007 0.000 
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Table 10: Andrews and Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Tests 
         
              Quantile of Risk Dep=0 Dep=1 Total H-L 
 Low High Actual Expect Actual Expect Obs Value 
         
         1 0.2378 0.3696 63 64.6429 32 30.3571 95 0.13066 
2 0.3715 0.4592 58 54.4700 37 40.5300 95 0.53620 
3 0.4593 0.5001 55 49.8254 40 45.1746 95 1.13016 
4 0.5021 0.5508 47 44.8684 48 50.1316 95 0.19191 
5 0.5508 0.5840 32 41.1933 63 53.8067 95 3.62250 
         
           Total 255 255.000 220 220.000 475 5.61142 
         
         H-L Statistic 5.6114  Prob. Chi-Sq(3) 0.1321  
Andrews Statistic 11.4536  Prob. Chi-Sq(5) 0.0431  
         
         
 
 
 
 
Table 11: The marginal effects of “Logit Panel Model P, ID, RD and T” 
Variable Mean b Mean ×b f(Z) bxf(Z) bxf(Z) in (%) 
ID 9.498947 0.235246 2.234589 0.248485 0.058455 5.84550616 
RD 33.04211 -0.007982 -0.26374 0.248485 -0.00198 -0.198340589 
G 0.760000 0.474224 0.36041 0.248485 0.117837 11.78374686 
C 
(Intercept) 
1.000000 -2.487275 -2.48727    
Total   -0.15602    
 
 
